Let r be the normalized two person zero sum game defined by a pay-off function M(x, y), for x£A, yE:B. If A and B are compact convex sets in a finite dimensional space, and M is bilinear, then T is strictly determined.
Then V has a value v(T) This note is concerned with games in which the first player Pi has more than one optimal strategy. Since At is convex, there are then an infinite number. Against an optimal strategy of P2, none of these will achieve more than v(T). However, if P2 should play nonoptimally, Pi might obtain more than zi(r), and the outcome might depend upon which optimal strategy from the set Ai he chooses. In many applications of game theory, it is desirable to have a systematic procedure for choosing a preferred strategy x in Ai which will take advantage of the possibility of error (nonintelligent action) on the part of the second player. Such a procedure will be given in this note; the resulting preferred optimal strategy is unique, up to equivalence, when the set B is a polyhedron.
Two first player strategies, x' and x", are said to be equivalent for the same T if M(x', y) =M(x", y) for all y£.B. When B is polyhedral, it has only a finite number of extreme points ir. These we call "pure" strategies for P2. Any y£2? is then a finite convex combination of pure strategies. We divide the pure strategies of the second player into two classes. A pure strategy ir is good if it is present in at least one optimal P2 strategy (i.e. if it occurs with nonzero coefficient in an optimal strategy). All other pure strategies are called poor. The dichotomy can also be made analytically.
If ir is a good pure strategy, then M(xi, ir) = v(T) for every optimal Xi£.4i; if t is a poor pure strategy, then there is at least one Xi^Ai with M(xi, ir)>v(T). Let B(1) be the closed convex hull of the set of poor pure strategies of P2. Let x(ElAx. Then, x(E.An for any n. If w is any extreme point of B which is a good strategy for P2 in r", then M(x, ir)=v(Tn). Every extreme point ir is good in V, or in one of the games Fj. Thus, M(x, w) = M(x, it), ior every tt and any choice of x<E.Ax. Since B is the convex hull of the points w, M(x, y) =M(x, y) for every y(E.B, and any choice of xtEA*,. Thus, all of the points of the set Ax are equivalent in r.
By this process, then, we have arrived at a strategy x which is optimal in each of the games T, Ti, T2, • • • , and which (when B is polyhedral) is unique, up to equivalence. When B is not polyhedral, the sequence B^n) may not terminate.
However, the strategies in the set A" still have the desirable properties described above, and are preferred optimal strategies.
We give a simple illustration. Consider the rectangular game whose (discrete) pay off matrix is "6 15 8 5" W = 2 7 3 4 4 .
.61745.
If T is the mixed game derived from W, so that A is a triangle and B a 4-simplex, then v(T) =4, Pi has two basic (extreme) optimal strategies x' = (1/2, 1/2, 0), x" = (0, 1/2, 1/2) and P2 has a unique optimal columns 3, 4 and 5.
Proceeding as above, the game Ti is then the mixed game obtained from the rectangular matrix w = \* 6 9/2l |_5 4 9/2J
This was obtained by computing [x', x"]W, and deleting from this matrix the first two columns. The value of Ti is v(Fi) =9/2, and Pi has the optimal strategies (1/2, 1/2) and (1/4, 3/4). The last column is optimal for P2. Repeating the process, T2 is the mixed game obtained from r 9/2 5 1 W = .19/2 9/2J
We see that ti(r2) = 14/3, that Pi has a unique optimal strategy (1/3, 2/3), and that 5(2) is empty. Retracing our steps, we arrive at # = (1/6, 1/2, 1/3) which is the unique preferred optimal strategy.
Note that its pay-off is xW=(i, 4, 14/3, 14/3, 9/2).
